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Urban lakes located in arid environments require large quantities of water to maintain their water levels, 
with much of this water associated with high opportunity costs.  Many of these lakes are manmade and 
provide various amenities to surrounding residents.  In this paper we use matching techniques to recover 
the average capitalized value of lakes to surrounding communities and differentiate between community 
members and adjacent households to recover heterogeneous treatment effects.  Importantly, we consider 
the role of both unobservable and observable features of matching to recover heterogeneous capitalization 
across lake communities.  Our results suggest that the capitalized value of lakes to community residents is 
highly heterogeneous and ranges from an annual value of -$29 to +$20 per homeowner per acre foot of 
water.  These results suggest that small changes in water pricing could remove the surplus benefits of 















THE VALUE OF WATER AS AN URBAN CLUB GOOD:  




The ecosystem services accorded by water in urban areas are of great policy relevance due to the 
increasing concentration of human societies in urban areas, the acceleration of growth in arid and semi-
arid cities dependent upon often strained groundwater and surface water supplies, and the uncertain 
effects of climate change on the level and variability of these supplies.  In addition to its value in indoor 
private consumption [36], water serves as an input into features of urban and suburban landscapes such as 
greenspace, water features, private landscaping, and swimming pools.  These amenities vary substantially 
in the range of services they provide, the excludability of these services across the landscape, and in the 
degree of public/private involvement in their provision and maintenance.   
A prominent trend in many areas, particularly high-growth arid regions in the U.S, has been the 
increasing provision of such amenities by home owners’ associations (HOAs) [33].  From 1980 to 2000, 
half the new housing in the United States occurred in developments governed by a neighborhood 
association with more than 50 million Americans now living in such communities [35].  While HOAs 
serve a range of governance functions, they are frequently tasked with providing, maintaining and 
regulating access to a range of “common” landscape amenities while assessing members (typically 
through membership dues) for the cost of their maintenance.
1  As such, HOAs serve as an institutional 
means to the provision and maintenance of club goods [15, 16] since many of their associated amenities 
provide services that are excludable to residents (either by explicit enforcement or by distance or 
geographic barriers) and are largely non-rival in their utility to residents.
2  In many cases the amenities 
that are provided may closely resemble, and to some degree substitute for, amenities provided by local 
and regional governments such as local parks and sporting facilities.   
Despite the potential for these clubs to enhance the welfare of their members, the “private” 
provision of amenities by HOAs may generate meaningful public spillovers.  In the domain of water 
consumption, if, as is frequently the case, water is supplied to developments at a subsidized rate below its 2 
 
social cost then community landscaping may be excessively skewed toward water-intensive features 
relative to what is socially optimal.
3  Therefore, there may be compelling social reasons to address the 
internal provision of amenities by HOAs through constraints at higher levels of governance via such tools 
as water pricing and zoning policies.  As a first step toward understanding the rationale and potential for 
such constraints it is first important to gain a sense of the benefits to residents of water usage in 
residential landscaping.  These values can then be compared to the marginal social cost of supply to 
assess the efficiency of current water use patterns within communities.  Furthermore, comparing these 
values to the pricing of water to communities can provide evidence of the distribution of the surplus or 
excess burden across community members and the general public.          
As a first step in this pursuit, we examine households’ valuation of water as conveyed through 
capitalization to houses located within communities with artificial, community lakes within the Phoenix 
metropolitan area.  Lake communities are a prominent and high-volume consumer of water.  In many 
cases this water derives from potable (after treatment) surface flows with potentially high opportunity 
costs.  The Phoenix area also obtains much of its water supply from the Colorado River and other surface 
water flows, and faces long-run vulnerabilities as the effects of climate change are likely to reduce water 
availability and increase its variability.  These long run constraints are currently not reflected in the water 
pricing structures employed by local municipalities.  Therefore, the study of urban lakes in this arid 
environment serves as a useful case study for considering the valuation of water in landscape amenities 
with an eye toward assessing its current efficiency and the degree to which the prevalence of such 
development may be responsive to changes in land-use and water policies.  
The substantive objective of our work is to recover the average surplus value of the water 
embodied in HOA-provided lakes to community residents – the benefits accruing to residents over and 
above the costs of maintenance.  To accomplish these objectives we assemble a large database of housing 
transactions data, detailed GIS layers on lakes and lake community boundaries, housing and 
neighborhood characteristics and other amenities.  The exclusive nature of the services provided by the 
lakes as well as their patchy distribution over the landscape allows us to conceptualize their services as 3 
 
falling into two additively-separable categories: 1) those accruing to HOA residents and 2) those accruing 
uniquely to HOA residents in lake-adjacent properties.  This ability to define binary “treatment” and 
“control” groups lends itself to the use of matching methods [23].  Conceptually, we match non-adjacent 
properties within HOAs to observationally similar properties outside the HOA to determine the average 
capitalization effect of lake access.  We also match lake-adjacent properties within HOAs to non-adjacent 
properties in the same community to estimate the average additional value of adjacency.  We then convert 
these estimated capitalization effects into equivalent rental rates and use data on lake surface area and 
evaporation rates to attribute this annualized value to the annual flow of water required to maintain the 
lakes on an annual basis.   
In addition, our paper makes a number of methodological advances.  First, we eschew a hedonic 
regression approach for the use of matching methods.  This approach allows us to flexibly control for 
selection on observable housing and neighborhood characteristics without requiring the explicit 
formulation of a potentially highly-nonlinear hedonic price function.  It also allows for generalized 
interactions between the amenities of interest and observable characteristics as well as for heterogeneous 
treatment effects both within and across lake communities.  Second, we broaden the selection-on-
observables assumptions implicit in matching to consider the importance of unobservable spatial and 
temporal factors.  We consider the effects of “matching on unobservables” by incorporating both “hard” 
and “soft” elements of matching within temporal and spatial windows – drawing an analogy between the 
matching and panel data literature [5, 6].   
 
2. BACKGROUND 
  The Phoenix metropolitan area has experienced rapid population growth and housing 
development in recent decades, with a population of over 4.1 million inhabitants in 2010 from a 
population in the 1950s of only 300,000.  To meet the demand of this development for water in the midst 
of a desert climate yielding approximately 7 inches of precipitation annually, the area relies upon a far-
flung infrastructure network to store and deliver surface water from the Salt and Verde River watersheds, 4 
 
water from the Colorado River, and, particularly in fringe areas, groundwater [27].  While conservation 
has dramatically reduced water use in Phoenix, per-capita usage remains high with residential use 
accounting for two-thirds of water demand [11].  Of this demand, approximately 74% occurs through 
outdoor use [32], primarily for swimming pools and landscape watering [31].   
A relatively small but conspicuous aspect of outdoor water demand in Phoenix is reflected in 
planned communities built around substantial private manmade lakes, with approximately 40 large scale 
developments fitting this description.  While scattered throughout the metropolitan area, they are 
especially common in the southeast near canal infrastructure (see Fig. 1).
4  These lakes are built by 
developers and maintained by HOAs who raise funds for their maintenance by charging residents higher 
HOA dues than in non-HOA communities.  The amount of this premium varies widely based upon the 
number of units in the community, the quality of water used and the nature of amenities provided but is 
often several times the fee of a non-lake HOA and may be hundreds of dollars a month [10].   
The nature of services provided by the lakes varies widely across communities.  Boating, fishing
5 
and other non-contact forms of recreation are commonly allowed (albeit with a range of restrictions) 
while water-skiing and swimming are permissible in a small number of cases where the source of the 
water is of adequate quality.  In addition to these benefits, lakes may grant aesthetic benefits from views, 
privacy or temperature moderation.
6  A common feature of these benefits is that they are largely exclusive 
to the membership of the HOA.  Most community bylaws explicitly forbid non-residents from using the 
lakes (except as a guest to a member) and lakes are rarely located on the exterior of communities.  
Furthermore, even within the community, there are typically variations in the degree of exclusivity across 
members due to the fact that only a fraction of properties are adjacent to the water, creating the potential 
for heterogeneous capitalization across homes.     
While they vary widely in size and allowable uses, an average lake community has approximately 
38 acres of surface area, and these lakes are fairly shallow, typically 8 to 12 feet in depth [8].  
Importantly, warm temperatures lead to extremely high evaporation rates – approximately 6 feet per year 
[8].  Therefore, a lake will typically require that 50-75% of its volume be replaced each year for its 5 
 
maintenance.  This dramatically increases the water demand of a community; the annual evaporation from 
an average lake community is nearly 230 acre-feet – enough to supply the water needs of over 1650 
single-family residential users.  Of course the opportunity cost of this water use depends to a large degree 
upon the source and quality of the water.  Older lake communities located near to delivery infrastructure 
for surface flows often use surface water supplied by the Salt River Project that can be used (after 
treatment) for drinking water.  However, newer lake communities (which are often located along the 
southern suburban fringe) often utilize reclaimed water or, if the community lacks access to surface 
supplies, groundwater.  While reclaimed water may have a lower opportunity cost than drinkable 
supplies, its use precludes a lake being used for swimming or skiing purposes.                               
                     
3.  DATA 
  In order to establish the average value of water in urban lake communities we first created a GIS 
layer of lakes and other water features utilizing a combination of land use data from the Maricopa 
Association of Governments and remote sensing data, verified by visual spot-checking using satellite 
mapping products.  From this information we are able to calculate the surface area of water in each water 
feature.  We then built a database of candidate lake communities and associated these water features with 
these communities.  In doing this we had to account for the fact that lakes are found in a variety of 
settings throughout the metropolitan area, and are often correlated with a variety of related land uses or 
community types that may confound our ability to isolate the effects of the lake itself.  We immediately 
eliminated lakes contained in public parks from our sample as well as lakes that are integrated within golf 
courses or lake communities that primarily serve retirement residents.  We also limit our attention to lake 
communities that primarily serve single-family residential customers.  Finally, we eliminated a small 
number of communities located in the extreme exurban fringe since it was felt that they were in a 
substantially different housing market.  This process left us with a sample of 29 candidate lake 
communities (Figure 1). 6 
 
  Given this initial sample, we then utilized information on subdivision names from assessor data 
combined with community maps to establish precise spatial boundaries for lake community membership.  
These boundaries provide a discrete measure of “treatment” given that houses inside the boundaries have 
the right to access the lakes and responsibilities of paying for their maintenance while those outside the 
bounds are likely excluded from most of the lakes’ services.
7  In other words, spatial boundaries and the 
boundaries of club membership coincide precisely.  Altogether, these communities contained 
approximately 1145 acres of lakes with a (conservative) combined volume of 9200 acre-feet and 
estimated annual evaporation of 6870 acre-feet – a rate of loss that can meet the demand of approximately 
50,000 Phoenix residential consumers.   
  While this reflects our ideal population of lake communities, we further restrict our sample in 
order to ensure that our identification strategy captures the value of the lakes themselves rather than other 
bundled aspects of particular lake communities that may differ markedly from typical “control” 
communities in ways that are not easily controlled for.  In particular, some communities offer unique 
amenities such as extensive clubhouse facilities, sports courts or are heavily integrated with park space 
(both public and private).  Other lake communities are highly clustered together such that separating the 
effects of community membership from broader neighborhood spillovers is problematic.  Still other lake 
communities are associated with custom, ultra-luxury housing or large-lot development for which suitable 
control communities are scarce (particularly within the same geographic area).
8  After omitting these 
communities, we have 15 communities left in our sample, representing 437 acres of lakes and more than 
2,600 acre-feet of annual evaporation.  While this dramatically restricts our sample, we feel this 
truncation is justifiable on the basis that our objective is not to recover the value of community 
membership itself but to credibly recover the value of the water associated with lake communities.  The 
communities in our final sample and their summary characteristics are presented in Table 1.         
  In order to build a dataset of housing transactions and characteristics within and outside lake 
communities, we combine data purchased from a private data vendor, Dataquick, with data from the 
Maricopa County assessor and restrict our attention to 2002 to 2005 sales containing a complete list of 7 
 
housing characteristics.  In addition to these characteristics, we also observe the sales price and sale date 
of each house as well as a unique identifier which allows us to link these data to GIS assessor parcel maps 
and assign a set of spatial coordinates to each house.  We supplement these parcel-specific variables with 
key neighborhood variables including variables relating to the amount of subdivision-provided open space 
(including measures of adjacency, distance to closest open space and overall provision
9) [5, 6], golf 
courses (including adjacency, a dummy reflecting whether the subdivision is in proximity to a golf 
course, and a distance variable for each house to the nearest course), and a dummy indicating the 
elementary school attendance zone associated with a parcel [14].   
                      
4. METHODOLOGY 
  To estimate the average value of water in maintaining the benefits associated with urban lakes we 
take the approach of first finding the average change in capitalization associated with lake community 
membership and subsequently finding the additional capitalization associated with adjacency.  Before 
detailing our estimation methods, we make two important points.  First, we hypothesize that the benefits 
from lakes within a community are likely heterogeneous due to the fact that some lots are adjacent to the 
water and may derive unique value from this proximity.  We therefore posit that the value to adjacent 
properties of lakes is additively separable into two components: a component that is shared (in the sense 
of having the same conditional expectation) between adjacent and non-adjacent properties and a 
component that is unique to adjacent properties.  Second, our measure of the “price” of the house does not 
include the cost of commitments attached to ownership of the house.  Most importantly, the price does not 
reflect the present discounted value of the home ownership fees paid by residents.  To the extent that 
these fees are substantially higher in lake communities than in otherwise similar non-lake communities 
(which anecdotally they are) any hedonic estimator utilizing the sales prices will tend to undervalue the 
amenities in the lake community.  However, our indications are that the differences in dues are primarily 
tied to the extra maintenance costs associated with the lakes themselves.  Therefore, a comparison of 
prices between lake and non-lake communities remains informative in that it yields estimates of the 8 
 
surplus value to homeowners above and beyond their contribution to the maintenance of the amenity 
itself.  A negative or zero price differential across otherwise identical lake and non-lake properties is 
therefore not necessarily indicative of zero value for the lake amenities but may reflect that the associated 
costs of the amenities exhausts or overwhelms any surplus value to homeowners.   
  Both membership in a lake community and adjacency to a lake within a particular neighborhood 
are fundamentally discrete amenities.  In asserting this we acknowledge that particular characteristics or 
the expected future services of amenities which consumers utilize in forming their bid functions may have 
continuous aspects; however, without substantial information we are unable to unlock these latent factors 
and therefore are tasked with valuing the bundled attributes in a consistent manner.  In other words, we 
can perceive membership and adjacency in each community as a discrete “treatment”.  Our econometric 
task is then to recover the average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) homes.   
  A vast array of approaches is available for estimating average treatment effects [9, 23].  A central 
concern of all these methods is that the assignment to the treatment group may be correlated with 
observable or unobservable variables which themselves have a role in determining the outcome of interest 
(i.e. the price of a house).  For instance, individuals that desire to live in lake communities may (either 
from income effects or due to heterogeneous preferences) also prefer homes with larger lots.  Failure to 
acknowledge this difference in comparisons between the treatment and control groups will yield biased 
ATT estimates.  Coping with omitted variable bias and other forms of endogeneity is a dominant theme in 
the hedonic pricing literature [5, 25, 37].
10 
  A common approach to valuing discrete amenities in the hedonic literature is to specify a 
(typically, but not necessarily, parametric) regression function controlling for observable aspects of a 
house and its neighborhood while entering a dummy variable into the hedonic price function for the 
discrete amenity in an additively separable fashion.  While the coefficient on this dummy variable is the 
ATT in such a model, this approach relies on strong identifying assumptions.  In particular deriving the 
ATT from a single parameter in a hedonic regression requires that the virtual price of the amenity in the 
underlying “true” hedonic price function not be dependent on the values of other observable 9 
 
characteristics, an assumption that is false in all but the most restrictive of scenarios for underlying utility 
functions and supply processes [26].
11 
  As a flexible alternative to restrictive regression approaches, we employ a tractable  matching 
estimator commonly used in the program evaluation literature [24].  The fundamental challenge for the 
estimation of ATT, adopting the language of Rubin’s potential outcome framework [41], is that we 
consistently fail to observe the counterfactual outcome for treated observations (i.e. we fail to observe the 
price of lake community houses if they weren’t located in lake communities).  Matching estimators 
impute this missing potential outcome from the reservoir of potential “control” observations and then 
average over the differences between the matched pairs to find the ATT.  This matching occurs in one of 
two ways.  The first employs the estimated propensity score [40], the probability of a unit with particular 
observable characteristics receiving the treatment, to provide this match.  Propensity score methods have 
seen fairly extensive use in papers on land use and conversion issues [13, 28-30, 34].  The second 
approach, which has seen broad use in the program evaluation and labor economic literatures [e.g. 17], is 
to match treated observations with the average outcome of a chosen number of their nearest neighbors 
from the control group, where “nearness” is determined by the distance of the observable covariate 
vectors along some norm.  Both methods provide valid ATT estimates under two assumptions.  The first, 
known variously as “conditional independence”, “ignorability” and “selection on observables”, is that the 
assignment to either the treatment or control group is independent of factors that affect the magnitude of 
the outcome variable after matching along observable factors.
12  The second is that the observable aspects 
of the treated and control observations exhibit sufficient overlap.     
  We adopt the nearest neighbor matching approach here.  While not necessarily superior to 
propensity score approaches, this technique has much to recommend it in our context.  In particular, given 
that we wish to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects over 15 different communities and adjacency 
within each community, this approach provides credible inference without the considerable number of 
difficult specification decisions involved in achieving consistent estimates of the propensity score for 
each treatment [4, 23].  Notwithstanding this advantage it has been demonstrated that matching estimators 10 
 
in which the number of matches is fixed as the sample size grows exhibit a bias due to imperfect 
matching of all covariates that does not disappear as the sample size increases – rendering the estimates 
inconsistent [2].  Furthermore, the large-sample variance of the estimator has not been well established 
and traditional bootstrap approaches to estimating the standard errors are invalid [3].   
Fortunately, Abadie and Imbens [2] have developed a version of the simple matching estimator 
which adjusts the imputed counterfactual outcome from matching using a regression estimator of the 
conditional mean outcome for control observations.  This estimator is not only consistent but also robust 
to misspecification of the regression equation [2].  Furthermore, a consistent estimate of the large-sample 
variance is available that accommodates general forms of heteroskedasticity [1, 2].  A recent Monte Carlo 
study demonstrates that this estimator has attractive properties in terms of bias, mean-squared-error and 
the coverage rate of confidence intervals [4].  Finally, these estimators are easily implemented within 
Stata [1].   
Despite their attractiveness, matching estimators (like regression) rely heavily upon the validity 
of the “selection on observables” assumption for their consistency.  However, the importance of 
controlling for potentially correlated unobservable heterogeneity is now well established in the hedonic 
pricing literature.  Two forms of heterogeneity are particularly important: 1) time-varying heterogeneity, 
including the potential for market adjustment within the sample frame [26], and 2) unobserved spatial 
heterogeneity, particularly difficult-to-measure “neighborhood” variables [37] such as school quality and 
local public good provision that are shared by a number of proximate properties [7].  Each is problematic 
when using matching methods since transactions that are ideal matches based on observable housing 
characteristics may differ markedly in terms of these neighborhood variables or occur on either side of a 
shock to a hedonic equilibrium.     
We utilize a number of methods to immunize our matching estimates to unobservable 
heterogeneity.  To account for time-varying effects over our multi-year sample of transactions we first 
deflate housing prices by a monthly price index for the local housing market to purge prices of common 
market trends.  We then include the date of sale as a covariate in the matching algorithm to control for 11 
 
seasonality or other temporal effects apart from the overall appreciation in our sample period.  We take 
special care to purge our estimates of correlated spatial effects, utilizing both “soft” and “hard” techniques 
to increase the probability of matching on important spatial heterogeneity as well as observable variables. 
In the “soft” category we include both the latitude and longitude of transactions and indicator variables 
for school attendance zone (an important aspect of neighborhood choice with demonstrated capitalization 
effects [14]) among the matching variables.  We supplement this approach by truncating the matching 
sample to neighborhoods within 1, 2 and 3-mile buffers of each lake community.  To the extent that 
properties within such buffers share many of the same unobservable neighborhood characteristics, 
differing across their housing prices identifies the effects of lake community membership on the basis of 
“within” variation – mimicking the approach of spatial fixed effects estimators [5, 12].
13  We examine the 
sensitivity of our estimates to using the more circumscribed buffers, paying particular attention to the 
potential tradeoff between controlling for unobservable heterogeneity and potential bias or lack of 
precision from poorer observable matches.  This is, to the authors’ knowledge, the first explicit 
consideration of spatial and temporal omitted variables bias within the applied land use propensity 
score/matching literature.        
                    
5. RESULTS 
The full suite of variables employed for matching are reported in Table 2.  These include a 
number of structural characteristics that are commonly included in property valuation studies as well as 
some controls for highly localized amenities (i.e. golf and subdivision open space) whose importance in 
this real estate market has been previously demonstrated [5, 7].  We also include the aforementioned 
“soft” controls for spatial and temporal heterogeneity.   
While we include date of sale as a matching variable to control for changes in the underlying 
hedonic equilibrium through time, this does not account for the overall appreciation of housing prices 
over the 2002 to 2005 sample period.  Simply averaging over matched price differentials may lead to 
ambiguity of units and may skew the comparison of the estimated treatment effects across communities if 12 
 
the temporal volume of transactions differs across communities.  Therefore, we normalize the sales prices 
of each house to January 2000 levels using the Case-Shiller monthly housing price index
14 for the 
Phoenix market prior to estimation. 
Once the control and outcome variables are selected, nearest neighbor matching requires two 
additional decisions from the analyst.  The first, assuming exact matching is impossible (which is the case 
here given the presence of continuous covariates), is to define a norm              
 
  for measuring the 
closeness of a match in the K dimensional space of observable covariates.  Two norms are commonly 
employed in the literature (although see [42]).  The first, known as the Mahalanobis metric, defines A as 
the inverse sample covariance of the matched covariates.  The second, employed by Abadie and Imbens 
[4], utilizes the diagonal entries of this matrix with the off-diagonal entries set to zero – measuring 
Euclidean distance on the standardized covariates so that deviations in covariates are weighted in inverse 
proportion to their standard errors.  We employ the second metric here exclusively, but preliminary 
analysis suggests that our results are not significantly influenced by the matching metric.  Preliminary 
results did suggest, however, that our estimates were sensitive to weak matching on two key 
characteristics that previous hedonic work has shown to be extremely important in determining the price 
of a house – the number of bathrooms and number of rooms.  By trying to match along competing 
dimensions, the matching algorithm sometimes compromised this critical dimension of the match.  We 
therefore increased the weighting on these two discrete covariates to force “exact” matching wherever 
possible before matching on secondary traits – a change that greatly increased the robustness of our 
estimates to alternative assumptions.
15    
The second major choice is the minimum number of matches to use from the control group for 
each treated unit.  As with the choice of bandwidth in a kernel regression, expanding the number of 
matches involves an increase in precision at the cost of greater potential bias.  This occurs because the 
quality of the match will typically deteriorate as the number of matches increases.  While there is no firm 
guidance from the literature, we follow empirical practice by selecting a small number of matches, 13 
 
ultimately selecting four matches for each observation, which yields sufficient precision given our fairly 
large sample of treated properties and the large reservoir of reasonable controls for most transactions.
16  
As with the matching metric, our results are not highly sensitive to this decision.               
               
5.1 Community Membership 
  Table 3 shows preliminary initial estimates of the average effect of community membership on 
the transaction price of housing for all 15 communities under three spatial definitions of the reservoir of 
controls.  The first control group is limited to a 1 mile buffer extending out from the boundaries of each 
lake community (where the buffers retain the shape of the community boundary).  The second and third 
groups include the initial set of controls while extending an additional 1 and 2 miles respectively.  As one 
metric of the quality of the observable matches behind each assessment we have included the percentage 
of exact matches obtained by the matching algorithm for the number of rooms and bathrooms.  While 
admittedly selective, it provides a metric of the extent of successful matching that is comparable across 
communities and across different control groups within a community. 
  Comparing these estimates at the 1 mile scale it is apparent that there is substantial heterogeneity 
in the estimates of ATT across communities as well as marked differences in the quality of matches.  This 
highlights the importance of addressing this problem in a heterogeneous treatment framework rather than 
averaging over communities in a manner which might introduce biases into our inferences.  A number of 
communities have very high rates of exact matches (>95%); however, some are far less satisfactory.  For 
example, Playa del Rey is a waterski community with substantially larger homes than are typically 
observed in its environs.   
  As we extend the buffer for control properties outward, we see (with the exception of Playa del 
Rey) that the quality of observable matches, as reflected by exact matching on number of rooms and 
bathrooms
17 increases substantially.  In fact, if we strictly adopt the conditional independence 
assumptions behind our estimator, we should strongly prefer matching at 3 mile buffers to matching 
within 1 mile.  However, in doing so we are assuming that any unobservable spatial heterogeneity that 14 
 
plays a role in determining housing prices is uncorrelated with the proximity of the control properties 
relative to the treatment community.  This is a very strong assumption.  By examining the sensitivity of 
our estimates to the scale of the control group we can assess the potential for biases due to spatial 
heterogeneity for each ATT estimate.  In doing this we find that several communities exhibit 
comparatively robust estimates of the ATT across different control groups in terms of the quantitative 
magnitude of estimates or the persistence of insignificant findings, particularly between the 1 mile and 2 
mile range.  On the other hand, we find there are 4 communities – Crystal Gardens, Oakwood Lakes, 
Pinelake Estates and Playa del Rey – that vary substantially.  These estimates also tend to be implausibly 
large (or excessively negative), calling into question their overall reliability.  Out of these four alarming 
cases, three exhibit exceptionally poor observable fit at the 1 mile range; therefore, it is possible that the 
swings in estimates may result from reductions in bias from poor observable matches as well.  Cases in 
which estimates are not robust over spatial scales can be resolved by matching to controls that are likely 
to share identical/similar unobserved traits (typically within a close spatial proximity of the treated home).  
However, doing this may compromise our ability to match closely along observable dimensions of 
homes.
18 Optimally resolving these countervailing biases in our choice of control group is difficult on an a 
priori basis. We therefore eliminate these communities from consideration in determining the value of 
water.   After eliminating these properties, we find that 6 of our estimates are positive and significant at 
the 5% significance level, 4 are insignificant, and one is negative and significant with effects on sale 
values that range between -$10,000 per house to over $22,000.  Importantly, these reflect the capitalized 
value of lake community membership without incorporating the levies from HOAs in prices.  Since HOA 
fees are clearly presented to potential homebuyers before they purchase a house and are part of the 
responsibility of owning a home, the obligation to pay them should be reflected in the final transaction 
price.  Therefore, these estimated values reflect the average value of community membership over and 
above the expected cost of maintenance for each homeowner.  As a result, small negative values may be 
consistent with the lakes providing gross amenities to non-adjacent homeowners in a community.                            
 15 
 
5.2 Adjacency   
  Table 4 contains estimates for the average treatment effects of lake adjacency within 
communities.  These are obtained by matching adjacent homes to observationally similar homes inside 
their community.  Despite relatively small numbers of transactions for adjacent properties (see Table 1), 
adjacency is statistically and economically significant in all but a handful of cases – far more consistently 
so than for community membership itself.  Not surprisingly, there is a substantial premium attached to the 
private benefits associated with adjacency – often running into the tens of thousands of dollars.   
  The quality of matches, as reflected by percentage of exact matches on number of rooms and 
bathrooms, is generally fair.  However, there are some cases where lower match percentages suggest 
some of our estimates may reflect the influence of substantial differences in the observable characteristics 
of homes relative to the non-adjacent homes they are evaluated against.  In the case of Playa del Rey, the 
estimated $100,000 premium for a house may reflect the benefits of immediate access to a ski lake, but it 
may also reflect the value of correlated housing characteristics such as high-end backyard entertaining 
fixtures or boat-lifts.  Similarly, in the case of The Islands, the quality of exact matches is sufficiently low 
as to suggest that the $70,000 premium attributed to lake adjacency may reflect, at least in part, the 
provision of larger, higher-end properties along the waterfront.                 
 
5.3 The Average Value of Water 
  To calculate the value of water we must first determine what the appropriate volume of water is 
for the purposes of valuation.  While we know the rough depth of lakes and can therefore calculate their 
volume, this volume is not the appropriate divisor in our calculations.  Rather we are concerned with the 
amount of water required to maintain the services provided by the lakes.  This is primarily reflected in the 
water required to counteract evaporation – a quantity of roughly 6 feet per year [8].  To resolve these 
annual evaporation estimates with our capitalization estimates, we must convert our capitalization 
estimates into equivalent annualized “rents”.  To do this we follow the literature by multiplying our 
estimates by 11% [39].  After making these conversions we divide the annualized rents by the number of 16 
 
acre-feet to get an estimate of the average annualized premium attributable to each home of an acre-foot 
of water.  We then sum these values over the number of houses in the neighborhood given the non-
rivalrous, club good nature of lakes in the community.  Table 5 reports our estimates, showing the average 
value attributable to an acre-foot of water due to the adjacency premium for all adjacent properties, its 
shared value to all community properties, and the total of both values.   
  Out of 11 properties, 4 show negative average values for water at the community scale while 
positive values range from less than $2,000 to more than $9,000 an acre-foot.  Recall that these are 
surplus values beyond homeowners’ contributions from their HOA dues.  Since HOA dues provide the 
funding for the placement of water orders to suppliers, this demonstrates that homeowners are, in most 
communities, willing to spend considerably more than their current rates for the services they derive from 
the water employed in their club goods.  The mean premium associated with an acre foot of water per 
homeowner varies between $3 and $20 with most communities falling in the $3 to $10 range.                 
  The value of water in adjacency is dramatic and accounts for 50% or more of the overall value of 
water, even though adjacent housing is typically a much smaller fraction of overall housing in the 
neighborhood.  Table 6 presents estimates of the annualized value of water on a per-home basis.  The 
implicit average value of water for adjacent homes as reflected in housing rents is many times that of non-
adjacent properties.  This has several interesting implications from a political economy perspective.  First, 
the supply of water to lake communities by public utilities at inefficiently low prices effectively serves as 
a substantial subsidy to a relatively small set of water-adjacent homeowners.  Second, the internal 
political economy of HOAs further skews this distributional consequence in that, to our knowledge, every 
community charges the same HOA fees to all members regardless of whether a home is adjacent to a lake 
or not.  This may have important consequences for the willingness of communities to expend additional 
resources for the better maintenance of their lakes since non-adjacent homeowners are the majority of the 
community yet often receive fairly small surplus benefits from the lakes.  Third, the excludable benefits 
of adjacency are sufficiently high to suggest that developers have strong incentives to manipulate lake 
topology and placement so as to maximize lake frontage for housing.  Indeed, we find this to be the case, 17 
 
with lakes taking extremely deformed shapes in the majority of cases (see Figure 2).  The average lake 
community in our initial sample has lakes with perimeters nearly five times that of a circle of equivalent 
surface area (a circle being the minimum-perimeter shape for a given area), and provision of significant 
community park space alongside lakes is extremely rare.  This finding is understandable since developers 
rarely retain management of the community after the initial sale of homes and therefore have incentives to 
maximize the initial sales value of the development.  However, there is evidence that this may lead to 
suboptimal lake design with respect to the long-run provision of services to residents since the large 
number of inlets can lead to poor water circulation, low dissolved oxygen, algae accumulation, fish kills 
and other challenges [8].  Countering these undesirable consequences often entails substantially higher 
maintenance costs to communities.                                    
 
6. DISCUSSION  
  We employ a bias-corrected form of nearest neighbor matching to assess the value of water as an 
input into the provision and maintenance of an urban club good.  This approach is unusual in that papers 
evaluating the value of water quantity rather than water quality outside of private, excludable 
consumption are very rare; while there are a handful of papers evaluating these questions in a recreational 
context [18, 19] we are not aware of any applications to housing transactions.  In deriving our estimates 
we make a number of methodological contributions to the matching literature.  Most notably, we 
demonstrate the importance of spatial scale in deriving the appropriate control group for our matches and 
suggest that omitted spatial variables may bias estimates if the scale of matching is picked incorrectly.  In 
many cases there will be a tradeoff between expanding the reservoir of controls to increase the closeness 
of matches on observable structural characteristics and increasing the likelihood of potentially poor 
matches on coarser-grained “neighborhood” variables.  We also demonstrate how the evaluation of 
spatially distinct treatments on an individual basis can help to uncover treatments whose effects cannot be 
reliably identified, helping to increase the integrity of estimates.   18 
 
  Ultimately we find that water in subdivision lakes has substantial value to homeowners over and 
above the everyday costs of maintenance.  Nevertheless, a large share of the benefits of these lakes 
apparently accrues exclusively to a minority of homeowners with lake frontage.  Our estimates are 
valuable in that they suggest the extent to which community water use may be elastic with respect to 
water pricing policies.  To the extent that levies for water exceed the mean values reported in Table 6, we 
would no longer expect lakes to function as net amenities to community members, deterring such 
development in the future.  Indeed, given the unequal distribution of benefits and maintenance costs 
between adjacent and non-adjacent homeowners, far smaller levies are necessary to turn many lakes into 
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Table 1: Lake Community Sales Characteristics
Community Adjacent Non-Adjacent Adjacent Non-Adjacent Adjacent Non-Adjacent
Crystal Gardens 596 309 454 238 143,641 131,153
Desert Harbor 278 1,006 114 429 197,411 140,002
Garden Lakes 234 1,982 83 846 185,895 136,559
Lago Estancia 114 299 35 121 166,308 144,612
Oakwood Lakes 62 138 19 64 266,349 200,900
Oasis at Anozira 40 347 15 110 230,264 221,912
Pecos Ranch 122 281 45 121 168,927 157,538
Pinelake Estates 98 119 120 130 323,696 275,192
Playa del Rey 33 93 17 71 413,823 294,640
Raintree Ranch 64 99 38 53 180,855 163,727
Stonebridge Lakes 119 249 38 110 189,856 157,258
The Islands 380 1,749 114 735 274,882 156,961
The Lakes 220 572 53 200 272,223 167,238
The Springs 330 329 141 160 158,005 124,611
Wind Drift 53 592 22 261 183,801 137,905

















Distance to closest golf
Subdivision open space (SOS) adjacent (0/1)
SOS distance






School attendance zone (0/1)
*
School district zone (0/1)
*
*  These are =1 when a property is in the same elementary school




Table 3: Average treatment effect on the treated for community membership 
Community ATT Std z-stat % exact ATT Std z-stat % exact ATT Std z-stat % exact
Crystal Gardens 52,894 3,013 17.56 96.85 -31,307 4,986 -6.28 100.00 -34,588 6,930 -4.99 100.00
Desert Harbor 6,831 2,030 3.37 90.21 6,472 4,105 1.58 99.13 5,635 3,365 1.67 99.94
Garden Lakes 3,317 874 3.79 90.28 10,468 720 14.55 98.17 4,618 835 5.53 98.82
Lago Estancia 3,645 1,744 2.09 97.52 4,733 1,846 2.56 99.59 -2,341 2,225 -1.05 100.00
Oakwood Lakes -45,712 5,659 -8.08 78.13 -3,149 5,077 -0.62 98.83 2,793 4,458 0.63 100.00
Oasis at Anozira 8,426 6,704 1.26 95.00 9,647 5,746 1.68 100.00 3,447 6,970 0.49 100.00
Pecos Ranch -3,379 2,213 -1.53 100.00 -3,149 2,289 -1.38 100.00 -4,914 2,281 -2.15 100.00
Pinelake Estates 9,245 8,794 1.05 86.92 -19,410 10,606 -1.83 95.19 -26,396 5,594 -4.72 100.00
Playa del Rey 35,496 12,280 2.89 50.70 8,707 14,014 0.62 52.46 -73,831 15,233 -4.85 59.15
Raintree Ranch -10,046 3,487 -2.88 100.00 2,825 3,298 0.86 100.00 1,214 3,725 0.33 100.00
Stonebridge Lakes -5,734 3,507 -1.63 100.00 5,881 6,041 0.97 100.00 5,528 6,316 0.88 100.00
The Islands 7,076 1,323 5.35 97.38 12,958 1,545 8.39 99.08 12,103 1,675 7.22 99.66
The Lakes 22,131 3,710 5.96 97.75 19,159 3,086 6.21 99.62 17,587 3,081 5.71 99.75
The Springs -195 1,782 -0.11 99.84 -714 1,786 -0.40 100.00 -6,166 1,761 -3.50 100.00
Wind Drift 4,655 1,485 3.14 99.62 4,265 1,358 3.14 100.00 2,950 1,364 2.16 100.00
1 Mile Buffer 2 Mile Buffer 3 Mile Buffer 
 
   
Table 4: Average treatment effect on the treated for lake adjacency
Community ATT Std z-stat % exact
Crystal Gardens 9,290 1,224 7.59 93.84
Desert Harbor 52,688 2,551 20.65 96.05
Garden Lakes 39,466 3,144 12.55 90.66
Lago Estancia 13,695 3,732 3.67 88.57
Oakwood Lakes 50,171 7,818 6.42 94.74
Oasis at Anozira 18,923 11,923 1.59 100.00
Pecos Ranch 19,008 3,648 5.21 85.56
Pinelake Estates 41,586 4,228 9.84 90.83
Playa del Rey 103,744 19,525 5.31 85.29
Raintree Ranch 3,996 3,768 1.06 94.74
Stonebridge Lakes 33,797 3,537 9.56 94.74
The Islands 71,832 5,709 12.58 83.55
The Lakes 69,911 10,008 6.99 71.70
The Springs 24,571 3,836 6.41 75.00




Table 5: The average value of maintenance water in lake communities
Community
Desert Harbor 47.7 286 5,633 $            3,373 $            9,007 $           
Garden Lakes 40.5 243 4,180 $            3,327 $            7,508 $           
Lago Estancia 15.2 91 1,885 $            1,817 $            3,703 $           
Oasis at Anozira 13.0 78 1,065 $            4,588 $            5,653 $           
Pecos Ranch 15.6 94 2,724 $            (1,599) $           1,125 $           
Raintree Ranch 5.0 30 936 $                (5,992) $           (5,056) $         
Stonebridge Lakes 11.7 70 6,290 $            (3,300) $           2,990 $           
The Islands 76.9 461 6,511 $            3,593 $            10,105 $        
The Lakes 45.5 273 6,191 $            7,056 $            13,247 $        
The Springs 33.8 203 4,403 $            (70) $                 4,333 $           
Wind Drift 5.9 35 3,407 $            9,332 $            12,738 $        













Table 6: The average value of maintenance water per home in lake communities
Community
Desert Harbor 7 $                                    23 $                                3 $                                    
Garden Lakes 3 $                                    19 $                                2 $                                    
Lago Estancia 9 $                                    21 $                                4 $                                    
Oasis at Anozira 15 $                                 38 $                                12 $                                 
Pecos Ranch 3 $                                    18 $                                (4) $                                  
Raintree Ranch (31) $                                (22) $                              (37) $                                
Stonebridge Lakes 8 $                                    44 $                                (9) $                                  
The Islands 5 $                                    19 $                                2 $                                    
The Lakes 17 $                                 37 $                                9 $                                    
The Springs 7 $                                    13 $                                (0) $                                  
Wind Drift 20 $                                 79 $                                14 $                                 





























                                                       
1 HOAs also frequently regulate “private” landscaping and structures in order to limit the externalities associated 
with private decisions – a form of localized zoning.  We do not consider these functions here.   
2 HOAs may also provide additional club goods by facilitating the sorting of individuals with similar characteristics 
(e.g. golfers or senior citizens) into communities.  
3 However, water intensive landscaping also creates a cooling effect that may alleviate the “urban heat island” 
beyond the bounds of the community, perhaps generating a countervailing positive externality to such development 
as well.  
4 Our definition of a lake community excludes lakes associated with golf course development or in which 
development abuts publically provided lakes or other water features.   
5 Certain fish species (i.e. white amur, common carp, goldfish) are frequently stocked as a means to control the 
populations of algae, grass and insect larvae in the lake.  In addition, sport fish such as bass and even trout, are often 
stocked for recreational purposes.      
6 Lakes may contain undesirable features that make them a dis-amenity.  For instance, a combination of high 
dissolved nutrients, high temperatures and poor water circulation may lead to algae growth and odor.  A variety of 
biological and chemical controls are employed by contracted lake managers to limit these problems.    
7 It is possible that there could be some spillover to neighboring homes but this is likely minimal since the design of 
lake communities typically makes the lakes highly interior to the development.    
8 Unfortunately, most water-ski lakes (with the possible exception of Playa del Rey) are associated with these sorts 
of high-end development.  This makes it impossible for us to thoroughly examine the difference in capitalization 
attributable to different levels of water quality.     
9 Overall provision is calculated as the total acreage of subdivision open space located within at least 500 feet of a 
home in the subdivision.  Using this calculation strategy, subdivision open space located between two adjacent 
subdivisions would be included in the total attributable to each subdivision. 
10 See Palmquist [38] for a useful survey of the hedonic pricing literature.   
11 Regression-based approaches are capable of estimating ATT under assumptions no more restrictive than those we 
employ in this paper [20-22].  However, doing so requires the use of nonparametric methods.     31 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
12 The conditional independence assumption is a generalization of the usual exogeneity assumptions for regression 
analysis [9].    
13 While analogous to spatial fixed effects estimation, the matching approach is far more general in that it is robust 
to non-additive spatial heterogeneity (i.e. interactions of spatial effects with observable characteristics).  
14 The Case-Shiller index is a quality-adjusted price index based upon repeat-sales estimation methods and is 
available from http://www.standardandpoors.com.   
15 We do this by up-weighting the weights for these variables by a factor of 1000 [1].   
16 In a simulation context, Abadie and Imbens [4] found that four matches performed well in terms of root mean 
squared error.   
17 We acknowledge that this metric does not capture all the relevant dimensions of covariate matching.  We are 
developing parsimonious ways of measuring the quality of matching along all covariate dimensions.   
18 A similar problem occurs in spatial panel estimation where fine spatial (“within”) variation in some characteristics 
may be sparse.    